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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 000791

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PHUM](#) [MARR](#) [MOPS](#) [KPKO](#) [UNSC](#) [SO](#)
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: DPKO BRIEFING NARROWS OPTIONS ON
INTERNATIONAL FORCE

REF: A. USUN 668
[1](#)B. USUN 689

Classified By: Amb. Zalmay Khalilzad, for reasons 1.4 b/d.

[1](#)1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 13.

[1](#)2. (SBU) SUMMARY: In Security Council consultations on Somalia on August 26, the U.S. push for accelerated planning for a UN peacekeeping operation (PKO) by rehatting AMISOM units was supported by Italy and African members but explicitly rejected by the UK and France. Other members of the Council delivered forward-leaning statements on international engagement but several of them favored deployment of a multinational force (MNF) as described by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). USUN requests Department policy guidance in deciding on a path forward in the Security Council. End Summary.

[1](#)3. (SBU) In response to a U.S. request for a briefing on the status of Secretariat contingency planning for an international force to eventually replace both Ethiopian troops and AMISOM in Somalia, three senior UN officials briefed the Security Council on August 26: A/SYG Edmond Mulet, Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah and DPKO Chief of Staff Colonel Ian Sinclair (UK).

SRSG's "heartfelt plea" for peacekeepers

[1](#)4. (SBU) Ould-Abdallah briefed on the August 19 signing of the Djibouti Agreement between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the opposition Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS). Ould-Abdallah argued that security in Somalia was "no worse than Afghanistan or Iraq" and suggested that writers in the Somali blogosphere purposefully exaggerate reports of violence to serve clan or political interests. Although he insisted that Somalia's rogue elements amounted to no more than 3,000 youths, Ould-Abdallah somewhat inconsistently appealed to the "P5 plus" to share intelligence on the situation in Somalia because "we don't know what's happening." He urged members to consider the Djibouti Agreement's request for an international stabilization force as "a heartfelt plea" from the Somali people and advocated quick deployment of an international force to allow UNPOS, the UN country team and some foreign embassies to relocate to Somalia.

DPKO pushes a MNF...

15. (SBU) DPKO's Col. Sinclair delivered a exhaustive briefing offering a sharply different view of the situation in Somalia than that held by the DPA's Ould-Abdallah. He told Council members that the security environment was extremely unstable and getting worse. He outlined the threats an international force would face and said that while some non-signatory groups could potentially be recruited into the political process, the more militarily capable among them would not negotiate, particularly Al-Shabaab.

16. (SBU) Reminding Council members of the military axiom to "plan for the worst," Sinclair reiterated DPKO's view that a "full-spectrum" MNF led by a capable lead nation was the only international force that could help secure Somalia under current conditions. Sinclair proposed that the MNF focus on a limited mission: monitoring Ethiopia's withdrawal; providing security for air, sea and supply routes and providing limited security for peace process venues in Mogadishu. He stressed that any troops deployed to such a mission must be logistically self-sustaining, well-equipped and well-trained in urban counter-insurgency. Insufficiently trained troops might react inappropriately to provocations, he said, which would endanger civilian lives and ultimately the credibility of the force. Sinclair stressed that the capabilities of the troops were more important than their numbers, but estimated that at least two brigades (approx. 8,000 troops) would be needed for a Mogadishu-only operation.

This would not include eventual reinforcements or the maritime component to the operation -- which he emphasized would be key, as the force might initially need to be based at sea.

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...and says a PKO won't fly

17. (SBU) Taking over from Col. Sinclair, DPKO A/SYG Mulet described how his department had considered and eliminated options for an "AMISOM-plus" operation or immediate deployment of a UNPKO:

AMISOM-plus: Mulet said that AMISOM is not a sound basis for an operation because it was not designed as a peacekeeping force: it is immobile. Moreover, it is under constant attack and concerned largely with defending itself. He told the Council that deployment of additional troops with similar capabilities would not expand AMISOM's effectiveness or influence on the ground. He said that the larger force would inevitably remain on base, unable to complete its task, and might use inappropriate force if attacked. While acknowledging the "temptation" to approve a less capable force, Mulet warned that such a decision could cause a setback to peace efforts or even prompt their failure.

UNPKO: Mulet said that immediate deployment of a PKO was not proposed because the situation in Somalia goes beyond what DPKO can provide. As an example, he cited UNAMID, which has proved ineffective despite a far more permissive security environment. He added that the UN's traditional system of contractor-based logistics would not be tenable in Somalia. Not only was there a lack of commercially available supplies, but any available contractors who could offer transportation would be linked to a clan or faction, and engaging them would encourage resentment and doubts about the UN's impartiality. Finally, he said that a MNF would be preferable to a PKO, as military actions taken by a PKO force would inevitably interfere with the UN's mediation efforts between the parties.

DPKO's offers MNF roadmap, wants broader political process

18. (SBU) Mulet warned members against "half-measures" and said that "the Security Council cannot afford any missteps that could be costly for Somalia and the UN." He told the Council that the political process should be as broad as

possible because excluding groups from negotiations would guarantee that those groups would attack any international force. Mulet said that the benchmarks in the Djibouti Agreement, including a cease-fire between the TFG and ARS, removal of checkpoints, and establishment of a joint TFG-ARS force, should be implemented before any international force could deploy. Once these conditions were met, Mulet proposed a three-phase approach for moving toward a MNF deployment. First, the UNSC would request the SYG to approach potential TCCs. The SYG would then respond within 30-60 days with recommendations. Finally, the UNSC and General Assembly would explore a funding mechanism for the MNF, following the precedent of the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL).

Council reaction: U.S. and Africa back movement toward PKO

¶9. (SBU) Amb. DiCarlo, speaking first, stressed the need to support the Djibouti Agreement with rapid deployment of a PKO. She advised the Secretariat that DPKO should focus on PKO contingency planning rather than using the proposal for a MNF as a reason not to prepare for a PKO. She was supported by South Africa's PermRep, who blasted the Secretariat for delivering a divided (DPKO/DPA) briefing and sarcastically asked why the Security Council wasn't warned about sending AMISOM into a "death trap" if the situation on the ground was as grave as DPKO claimed. Italy said that AMISOM should be "raised to a level to facilitate UN rehatting."

¶10. Other members issued forward-leaning statements that left the door open to a PKO without specifying modalities. Burkina Faso advocated quick deployment of an international stabilization force and said that in-depth consideration should not be a reason for losing time. Libya said that the international community should increase logistical and other support to AMISOM and should not impose draconian conditions before considering deployment of an international force. China said that conditions for a UNPKO did not exist but said that the UN should work hard to create such conditions through AMISOM's full deployment: "if the AU can do it, the UN can do it."

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UK, France favor MNF; Russia, Belgium skeptical

¶11. (SBU) The UK and France agreed with DPKO's assessment that a capable MNF was the only realistic option for Somalia. The UK PermRep explicitly stated that AMISOM could not form the basis for a PKO and argued that UNAMID was not an example the UNSC should repeat. He agreed with the SRSG that Somalia was no worse than Iraq or Afghanistan but pointed out that in those countries, the international community has deployed strong MNFs. The French DPR said he supported AMISOM's full deployment but that it lacked the needed capabilities for a stabilization force. France was open to a PKO at a much later stage, but in the meantime encouraged the Secretariat and the AU to work together on a MNF. Russia said that any operation would need to wait for a more stable peace in Somalia, including a more inclusive political dialogue. Russian DPR Dolgov said that Russia would not exclude any particular option, but agreed with DPKO that any such force must be "maximally equipped" and added "let's be honest - the numbers will be very, very high." Belgium said that the Security Council's credibility was at stake, and that members needed to be "careful and responsible" in their actions.

Other members want action, but many defer to DPKO

¶12. (SBU) Costa Rica said that a "consensus for action" existed on the Council, and urged members to stop requesting reports and take action toward a MNF as suggested by DPKO rather than "shooting the messenger." Panama said that the time had come for "well-considered action," and urged members

to heed DPKO's concerns. Indonesia praised DPKO's briefing as extensive and valuable, while advocating quick deployment of an international force. Croatia noted the worsening security situation and said that it was open to various proposals on peacekeeping, but that the UNSC should work to strengthen AMISOM in the meantime. Vietnam said the UNSC should act in a decisive manner to bring peace to Somalia.

Action Request:

13. (C) A consensus for some type of action does exist on the Security Council, but the Council remains divided on how to proceed. Skeptical members (UK, France, Russia and Belgium) believe that their doubts have been confirmed and several states that may have been willing to consider quick movement toward a PKO will now defer to DPKO's forceful and detailed arguments that only a MNF is realistic. As we move forward on this issue, USUN sees two policy options and requests Department guidance on how to proceed:

A - Push harder: In order to achieve the objective of a PKO for Somalia, the U.S. could table our own proposal for PKO deployment, either through strengthening AMISOM in order to facilitate the operation's rehatting or by deploying a standalone operation. At present, our advocacy is at odds with what the UN and other P5 members are saying, and it is unlikely that further requests for planning from DPKO will produce results consistent with the Department's objectives. Strong USG arguments backed by sound military planning will help us win Council support by convincing DPKO and skeptical members that a PKO is reasonable, achievable and capable of making a positive impact on the ground in Somalia. This option will require substantial Washington engagement on military planning in order to ensure that our analysis is sufficiently detailed to rebut the concerns raised by DPKO.

B - Change course: Taking into account the views of DPKO and many Council members, the U.S. could retool and engage the Secretariat and Council members on a MNF along the lines of the action plan proposed by DPKO and described in paragraph 8 above. This option is the most likely basis for Council consensus on an international force for Somalia. While DPKO is prepared to undertake TCC outreach and military planning alongside a lead nation, this approach may require high-level U.S. engagement in Cairo, Riyadh, Abuja and other capitals in order to generate forces and ensure funding and training for a potential MNF.

Failing either of the above, we will continue to espouse a PKO but with little likelihood of achieving our goal, and the situation in Somalia will continue to founder. End action

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request.

Khalilzad